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WHEN YOUR BOSS "FRIENDS" YOU:
SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT CLAIM
INTRODUCTION
Since its advent, social media has played an increasing role in
the workplace and in employment related issues.' Where
networking and recruiting used to be accomplished through
phone calls and lunches, they are now accomplished with online
profiles and connections. Where Facebook used to be for col-
lege students only, companies now set up profiles to market
their products. Where employees used to communicate by
walking down to the next office or using company e-mail ac-
counts, employees can now tweet their activities and follow their
co-workers online posts about work and personal life. Addi-
tionally, much of the technology available today, including
smart phones and laptops, has blurred the line between work
and personal life.2 Gone are the days when an employer's big-
gest worry about the internet was lost productivity of its em-
ployees.3 Now, social media presents a host of new legal issues
for employers.4
Social networks affect all aspects of employment, including
employee recruitment, employee privacy, and electronic discov-
1 See Michael A. Curley & Debra Morway, Legal Issues Arising from the Use
of Social Networks at Work, 833 P.L.I. LITIG. & ADMIN. PRACTICE SERIES
539, 542 (2010).
2 Anthony J. Oncidi & David Gross, Blackberrys on the Beach: A Ripening
Concern for Employers, 51 ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 10, 10 (Jan. 2009)
(describing how voicemail, Blackberries, and the internet make it possible to
do work anywhere).
3 See Curley, supra note 1, at 541-42 (discussing various issues that arise in
the employment context because of internet use).
4 See id.
41
ery during litigation.5 In February 2009, for the first time, con-
sumers spent more time on social networking sites than they did
checking their e-mail.6 As social media blurs the line between
workplace conduct and off-duty conduct, employer liability for
sexual harassment through social media becomes an important
and complex issue.7 As employees use third-party websites to
communicate, the issue of employer liability becomes murky.8
Time, place, and social context are all important factors in deter-
mining employer liability. 9 If an employee posts a harassing
comment to another employee on a third-party website, is the
employer liable for that conduct? Did it happen in the work-
place or in cyberspace? If there is no verbal harassment in the
workplace, but a supervisor continuously posts harassing
messages to an employee's Facebook page during work hours,
can the employer be held liable?
Employers need to be aware that an employee's online pres-
ence could instigate future harassment claims.10 Posting
messages online creates a record of sexual harassment." In her
study on women's use of employer grievance procedures to ad-
5 See id. at 539 (2010); Kelly Kichline & Laura Thalacker, Pitfall Potential:
The Risks of Social Media, NEv. LAW. 16, 16 (Sept. 2010).
6 See Curley, supra note 1, at 543.
7 See Kichline, supra note 5 (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing be-
tween employee conduct inside and outside the workplace because of social
media).
8 See Richard A. Paul & Lisa Hird Chung, Brave New CyberWorld: The Em-
ployer's Legal Guide to the Interactive Internet, 24 LAB. LAw. 109, 118-20
(Summer 2008).
9 See Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998)
(describing how the context and surrounding circumstances of the harass-
ment should be considered by the court in determining liability).
10 See Kichline, supra note 5, at 17-21 (giving examples of co-worker harass-
ment through social media and explaining employer liability).
11 See Nicole D. Galli, Christopher D. Olszyk, Jr., & Jeffrey G. Wilhelm,
Social Media Symposium: Litigation Consideration Involving Social Media,
81 P.A. BAR Ass'N Q. 59, 61 (2001) (discussing the permanence of postings
on social media websites and the fact that items removed from a website may
still be retained by a website, such as Facebook). See also Wolfe v. Fayette-
ville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1015-1018 (W.D. Ark. 2009)
(where the student-harassers created a Facebook group named "Everyone
hates [plaintiff-student]" that established a digital record, including videos, of
42 DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GENDER & L. [Vol. 1:1
dress sexual harassment, associate professor of sociology and
law, Anna-Maria Marshall, describes how women tend not to
report sexual harassment unless they can document it or provide
evidence. 1 2 Social media provides an instant record of all
harassing comments, and this could increase the likelihood that
a woman or any harassed individual would report an incident.13
Context is also an important factor in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) harassment claims.14 Although
the use of social media is not completely ubiquitous, there are
millions of users who have come to rely on social media as a way
to organize their social life.15 In addition, social media is inte-
grated into the workplace with many employers using it as a
recruiting or marketing tool.16 If social media is integrated into
the workplace culture, the fact that harassing comments or
photos are posted on a third-party social networking website
may not be enough to insulate the employer from liability.'7
This article focuses on hostile environment claims, examining
how both employee and employer's increasing reliance on social
media affects the workplace environment and employer liability.
There have been some federal district court opinions and a few
appellate court decisions dealing with social media and sexual
the physical and verbal sexual-orientation harassment suffered by the
plaintiff).
12 See Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees' Rights Consciousness
and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 LAw & Soc'y REV.
83, 114-115 (2005) (describing how women themselves had narrow definitions
of harassment and stating that many feel an incident cannot be categorized as
sexual harassment without evidence or documentation to prove that it
happened).
13 See id.
14 See Oncale, 532 U.S. at 81-82.
15 See, e.g., TwITTER, Twitter.com, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Dec.
30, 2010); FACEBOOK, Facebook.com, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.
php?statistics (last visited Dec. 30, 2010) (statistics on usage). See also Ethan
Zelizer, Ten Rules for A Social Media Policy: Embracing and Controlling
Social Media in the Workplace, 24 CBA REC. 52, 52-57 (Oct. 2010) (describ-
ing the pervasiveness of social media in the workplace).
16 See Curley, supra note 1, at 545.
17 For a description of the pervasiveness of social media in the workplace,
see generally id.; Kichline, supra note 5; Zelizer, supra note 15, at 52.
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harassment in the workplace.18 These cases demonstrate that
social networking websites can be considered a part of the work-
place environment.19 However, the issue of student harassment
via social media has received more media attention and has
been fleshed out in the district and circuit courts to a greater
extent than employment cases. 20 For that reason, this article will
also use Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972
(Title IX) cases where students allege sexual or other harass-
ment has taken place through social media.
Part II describes the types of social media available to con-
sumers and how consumers generally use them. Part III dis-
cusses sexual harassment claims made under Title VII and
identifies the aspects of those claims most likely to be affected
by social media.
Part IV examines recent and relevant federal district and cir-
cuit court decisions dealing with Title VII claims and instructive
decisions dealing with student Title IX claims. This part ana-
lyzes how the use of social media affects the scope of employer
liability in a hostile environment claim. First, it discusses how
social networking activity can create a severe and pervasive hos-
tile work environment. Then, it examines when social network-
ing is imputable to employers. Finally, it switches gears to look
at employee privacy and employer efforts at monitoring and
18 See generally Jabbar v. Travel Services, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 77, 81-82
(Dist. P.R. 2010) (alleging harassment through, among other things, com-
ments on a Facebook page); Urban v. Capital Fitness d/b/a XSport Fitness,
No. CV08-3858, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124307, at *21-25 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23,
2010) (alleging harassment through, among other things, sexually suggestive
pictures of workers placed on a MySpace page).
19 See generally Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 81-82; Urban, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124307, at *23-27 (In both cases, the courts implicitly concluded that
the social networking site at issue could contribute to a hostile workplace
environment, though neither court found that the site actually did contribute
to the case at hand).
20 For examples of the reasoning behind student-harassment, see generally
R.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Hastings-on-Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 371
Fed. App'x 231, 233-34 (2d Cir. 2010) (student alleged harassment through
emails and online chats); Wolfe, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1017 (student provided
evidence of harassment through YouTube videos, online postings, and a
Facebook page).
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preventing harassment through social media before the harass-
ment becomes a litigation matter.
Both the courts and employers should recognize social media
as part of the workplace environment. Harassment through so-
cial media is still harassment, and the victim may even perceive
online harassment as more hurtful than face-to-face harass-
ment. 2 1 Employers must fulfill their duty to prevent sexual har-
assment when possible, and courts should take into
consideration the social context in which the harassment occurs.
II. SOCIAL MEDIA HARASSMENT DEFINED
As a relatively new phenomenon, it is important to define and
explain social media before beginning a discussion about it.22
When employees first started gaining access to the internet, its
main functions were gathering information and making transac-
tions.23 Employers worried that employee access to the internet
would lead to decreased productivity. 24 Since then, the internet
has undergone dramatic changes. This part first defines social
media and describes some of the most common social forms of
social media. Then it discusses how social media can be used as
a tool for sexual harassment.
A. Social Media: Types and Definitions
The World Wide Web, now commonly called Web 2.0, allows
users to generate content and interact with each other.25 Web
2.0 allows users to collaborate with one another and create on-
line networks of people. 26 There are several different types of
21 See generally Jodi K. Biber et. al., Sexual Harassment in Online Communi-
cations: Effects of Gender and Discourse Medium, CYBER PSYCHOLOGY &
BEHAV., Feb. 1, 2002, at 33 (findings revealed that participants thought mis-
ogynist comments made online were more offensive than those made in a
traditional face-to-face setting).
22 See Curley, supra note 1.
23 See Paul, supra note 8.
24 See Curley, supra note 1.
25 See Paul, supra note 8; Zelizer, supra note 15.
26 See Paul, supra note 8; Zelizer, supra note 15.
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online social media tools used by employees. 27 The following is
not an exhaustive list of social media sites, but it gives examples
of the types of social networking opportunities that are
available.
Facebook is the most popular social networking site.28 It and
MySpace allow users to create their own pages and share con-
tent, including photos, links, and blogs.29 Facebook users con-
nect with each other by sending and accepting "friend"
requests.30 Similarly, Linkedln is a business-centered network-
ing site that focuses on users creating a network of business con-
tacts.31 While Facebook and MySpace allow their users to make
all of their information available to all users, LinkedIn uses a
"gated-access" approach, which means users can only contact
each other when a pre-existing relationship exists.32 In this way,
LinkedIn attempts to appear more exclusive and selective than
either Facebook or MySpace because its goal is not solely to
keep you in contact with people but to leverage your contacts in
the job market. 33
Blogs, or weblogs, as they were originally called, are sites on
which an author can write on any given topic.34 An author may
choose to write about any subject, including providing commen-
tary on developments in a certain industry or making entries in a
personal journal.35 The most important feature of blogs is that
readers can leave commentary and interact with the author.36
Unlike traditional blogs, Twitter is a site that allows micro-blog-
ging.37 Instead of making long posts on a subject, users are lim-
27 See Zelizer, supra note 15, at 53.
28 See FACEBOOK, supra note 15.
29 See Zelizer, supra note 15.
30 See Curley, supra note 1, at 543.
31 See id. at 544.
32 See Zelizer, supra note 15, at 53.
33 See id.
34 See Paul, supra note 8, at 110.
3s See id.
36 See id. See also Zelizer, supra note 15, at 52-53 (discussing the origins of
the phrase "Web 2.0").
37 See Zelizer, supra note 15, at 53-54.
46 [Vol. 1:1
20111 WHEN YOUR BOSS "FRIENDS" YOU 47
ited to 140 characters.38 These posts are known as "tweets," and
like a blog, the author will have subscribers, known as "follow-
ers," who comment on the author's tweets.39
Facebook has more than 500 million users worldwide. 40 Two
hundred million of those users access Facebook through their
mobile device and are twice as active as the users who do not
use mobile devices. 41 Twitter has 175 million registered users
who post 95 million tweets per day, with the most activity occur-
ring between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. Central Standard Time
(CST).42 During work hours, 50% of social media updates are
made on mobile devices.43 Given the number of users and the
amount of time those users spend on social networking sites, it is
inevitable that employees will interact over social media both
during work and after work.44
B. Social Media Use and Harassment
Social networking sites and forums are effective ways of com-
municating, but like any form of communication, they also have
the potential to expose users to harassment.45 The fact that the
content is all user-created and posted, without any intervention
or editing by a third-party, makes it easy for offensive and even
defamatory content to proliferate on these sites.46 While much
of the research discussing online harassment focuses on the use
of social networking sites by teens and youths, adult participa-
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 FACEBOOK, supra note 15.
41 Id.
42 TWITTER, supra note 15; See Zelizer, supra note 15, at 53.
43 See Zelizer, supra note 15, at 53.
44 See id. at 52-53.
45 See Joshua N. Azriel, Social Networking as a Communications Weapon to
Harm Victims: Facebook, MySpace and Twitter Demonstrate a Need to
Amend Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 26 J. MARSHALL J.
OF COMPUTER & INFO L. 415, 415 (2009).
46 See id.
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tion in social networking and social media is increasing rapidly. 47
In fact, a 2007 study found that the median age of those who
frequently go online to connect with people, manage digital con-
tent, work with online community groups, and pursue hobbies
was thirty-eight years of age. 4 8 Social media use is pervasive in
every age group; the Pew Center reported in December 2009
that "every generation 45 and older more than doubled their
participation" in social networking activity.49
With such a variety of social networking options comes a vari-
ety of ways that a victim can be harassed through social media
by co-workers or supervisors, which may create a hostile work
environment.50 Harassers may post discriminatory comments
directed at a victim either on the victim's personal website or on
a public website.-5 Harassers could go one step further and cre-
ate an online community or forum where members disparage
the victim and perhaps post pictures and videos of the victim. 5 2
It has been found that harassment could even be as simple as
sending a Facebook "friend" request.53
47 See Paul, supra note 8; Teddy Wayne, Age Gap Narrows on Social
Networking, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/12/27/business/media/27drill.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=social%20network-
ing&st=cse.
48 See Paul, supra note 8, at 109-110 (citing John B. Harrigan, A Typology Of
Information and Communication Technology Users, PEW INTERNET &
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 14 (2007)).
49 See Wayne, supra note 47.
50 See Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 81-82 (plaintiff claimed that a hostile envi-
ronment was created when a co-worker posted racially charged remarks to a
photo of the plaintiff on a Facebook page); Wolfe, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1017
(students physically and verbally harassed plaintiff and posted videos of the
harassment on a Facebook page where other students commented).
51 See Azriel, supra note 45, at 118-20.
52 See Wolfe, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1017.
53 See Zelizer, supra note 15, at 55-56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2010)
(prohibiting discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin).
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I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT As DEFINED IN TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.54 Congress gave the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) the power to de-
fine discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII, and the
EEOC included sexual harassment in its definition of discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex.5 5 Although it was not until 1986 that
the United States Supreme Court first addressed a claim of sex-
ual harassment under Title VII, there is still a large body of law
interpreting Title VII and the EEOC's regulations. 56 This part
discusses the evolution of the hostile environment claim under
Title VII and explains its general requirements. Then, it exam-
ines the aspects of a hostile environment claim which are most
affected by social media, including the severe and pervasive re-
quirement and the employer liability requirement. Finally, it
concludes by discussing affirmative defenses available to
employers.
A. History and General Requirements
Title VII has an anti-discrimination clause and an anti-retalia-
tion clause57 The anti-discrimination clause protects employees
against discrimination based on their race, color, religion, gen-
der, or national origin.58 The anti-retaliation clause protects em-
ployees against retaliation for opposition to discrimination on
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
55 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(2010); Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (dis-
cussing sexual harassment claims).
56 See Diane Avery, Overview of the Law of Sexual Harassment and Related
Claims, in LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE 2,3 (Matthew Schiff
& Linda C. Kramer, eds., 2d ed. 2000); Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 64-
65.
57 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), 2000e-3(a) (protecting workers from
retaliation).
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
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those bases.59 Another important distinction between these
clauses is that the anti-retaliation clause explicitly allows courts
to consider off-duty behavior of the employee, 60 while the anti-
discrimination clause does not have any such wording.61 This
article will focus solely on hostile environment claims under the
anti-discrimination clause of Title VII.
Congress gave the EEOC the power to define sexual discrimi-
nation.62 In 1980, the EEOC published its regulations stating
that there are two forms of sexual discrimination: (i) quid pro
quo, when submission to or acquiescence in harassing conduct is
made a condition of the victim's employment, 63 and (ii) hostile
environment, when the victim is subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment which affects the terms and conditions of his or her
employment.6A In 1986, the United States Supreme Court, in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, affirmed the EEOC's regula-
tion, stating the hostile environment claim was a form of sex
discrimination prohibited under Title VII.65 This article focuses
on how social networking activities by employees affect the
workplace environment and may give rise to hostile work envi-
ronment claims.
To prevail in a hostile work environment claim, the victim
must establish a prima facie case by proving four elements.66
First, the victim must belong to a protected class and have been
"subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment," which includes
59 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), 2000e-3(a).
6o See Patterson, Article, None of Your Business: Barring Evidence of Non-
Workplace Harassment for Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 10 U. C.
DAVIS Bus. L.J. 237, 242-244 (2010) (discussing the differences between anti-
discrimination and anti-retaliation litigation).
61 See id.
62 See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65 (discussing EEOC guidelines
and the weight of authority the guidelines receive).
63 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (2010).
6 See 29 CFR § 1604.11(a)(3); Avery, supra note 56 (describing the differ-
ences and evolution of quid pro quo and hostile environment claims).
65 See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65; Avery, supra note 56.
66 See Avery, supra note 56, at 5.
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verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.67 Second, the har-
assment must have been based on sex. 6 8 Third, the harassment
must have affected some "term, condition or privilege of em-
ployment."69 Finally, "the doctrine of respondeat superior ap-
plies,"70 and the employer is vicariously liable for the conduct.7'
Inherent in these four elements are several obstacles for the
victim that prevent the majority of hostile environment claims
from surviving summary judgment.72 First, in order to show the
harassment affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment,73 the victim must prove the harassment was severe
and pervasive in the work environment.74 Next, the victim must
prove the employer was liable for the harassment.75 Finally, the
victim must overcome any affirmative defenses the employer
presents. 76
B. Severe and Pervasive Requirement
The severe and pervasive requirement measures the serious-
ness of the conduct.77 Conduct that is less severe requires more
repetition in order to meet the severe and pervasive require-
ment, while conduct that is more severe and damaging requires
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 Respondeat superior is "the doctrine holding an employer or principal lia-
ble for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of
the employment or agency." BLACK's LAw DICrlONARY (9th ed. 2009).
71 See Avery, supra note 56, at 5-7, 8-19.
72 See Patterson, supra note 60, at 245.
73 See Avery, supra note 56, at 6.
74 See id.
75 See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 750-56 (1998); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802-804 (1998); Patterson, supra note 60, at
245-47.
76 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 129 S. Ct.
846, 852 (2009).
77 See Avery, supra note 56, at 6.
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less repetition to meet the requirement.78 If the conduct in-
volves one instance of sexual harassment, unless the instance
constitutes sexual assault, it would not satisfy the severe and
pervasive requirement, and the employer would not be liable. 79
The severe and pervasive requirement has both an objective
component and a subjective component.80 The victim must
prove the harassment creates an "objectively hostile or abusive
work environment" where the victim "subjectively perceives the
environment to be abusive."8' The United States Supreme
Court has emphasized the perspective of the victim and the sur-
rounding social context of the workplace to determine whether
or not the conduct in question is severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile work environment.82 In Oncale v.
Sundower Offshore Services, Inc., the Court stated, "the objec-
tive severity of harassment should be judged from the perspec-
tive of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position,
considering 'all the circumstances.'"83 In light of this focus on
the context of the harassment, the sex of the victim and harasser
does not matter as long as the harassment was based on sex. 8 4
C. Employer Liability
After establishing severe and pervasive harassment, the vic-
tim must prove the employer is liable for the hostile work envi-
ronment through agency principles.85 Employers are held
vicariously liable for hostile work environments created by su-
78 See Ferris v Delta Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2001)
(describing how one act of harassment can meet the severe and pervasive
requirement if it is egregious).
79 See id.
80 See Avery, supra note 56, at 6.
81 See id. at 7.
82 See Oncale, 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (discussing the reasonable person standard
used in these cases).
83 See id. at 81.
84 See id. at 81-82.
85 See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 754-55 (1998); Patterson, supra note 60, at
248-52.
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pervisors with authority over the harassed employee or victim.86
Employers can be held liable for harassment by co-employees
(who have no supervisory authority) only when the employer is
negligent.8 7 An employer is found negligent in two instances:
when an employer fails to set up a process to handle complaints,
thereby denying the employee any opportunity to complain, or
when an employer has a process to handle complaints, but does
not utilize such process once it receives a complaint.88
While the issue of vicarious liability for workplace conduct is
fairly straightforward, the issue of employer liability for em-
ployee off-duty conduct is quite murky because the Circuit
Courts have taken different approaches to admissibility of, and
liability for, off-duty conduct.89 For example, the Sixth Circuit
generally does not admit evidence of off-duty conduct to sup-
port a hostile work environment claim, while the First and Sev-
enth Circuits generally do admit such evidence.90 Furthermore,
in Ferris v Delta Airlines, Inc, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that if the employer has notice of alleged sexual har-
assment, it can be liable for egregious off-duty conduct, such as
rape, when it leads to a hostile working environment.91 How-
ever, the court noted that in light of the reasonable care stan-
dards at play, off-duty incidents of behavior, such as flirtation or
crude talk, would be less likely to lead to liability for the em-
ployer.92 Thus, an employer's liability for off-duty conduct, in-
cluding off-duty postings to social media networking sites, arises
in less predictable ways than liability for workplace conduct and
depends heavily on the particular Circuit Court's approach.
86 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852.
87 See Ferris, 277 F.3d at 136; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799.
88 See Ferris, 277 F.3d at 136; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799.
89 See generally Patterson, supra note 60, at 52-57 (discussing the circuit split
on the use of off-duty conduct to prove a hostile work environment).
90 See id. (comparing the Sixth Circuit's limited approach with the more per-
missive approaches in the First and Seventh Circuits).
91 See Ferris, 277 F.3d at 137.
92 See id.
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D. Affirmative Defenses
Even if the victim overcomes the hurdles inherent in estab-
lishing a prima facie case of sexual harassment, the employer
may still be able to avoid liability by raising an affirmative de-
fense.93 Affirmative defenses, however, are not always available
to employers.94 If the victim alleges that his or her employer,
through its employees, had taken a "tangible employment ac-
tion" against the victim in a hostile environment case, then the
employer has no affirmative defense available.95 A "tangible
employment action" is when a supervisor makes an economic
decision affecting the employees under his or her control. 96 The
decision must cause a "significant change in employment status
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with sig-
nificantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a signif-
icant change in benefits."97 However, if the employer did not
take a "tangible employment action" against the victim, the em-
ployer can demonstrate that it exercised reasonable care to stop
or prevent the discriminatory conduct.98 Therefore, when an
employee does not allege a "tangible employment action," the
employer is able to assert an affirmative defense.99
The employer's affirmative defense has two elements: first,
the employer must exercise "reasonable care to prevent and cor-
rect promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and second, the
employee-victim must have "unreasonably failed to take advan-
tage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."00 The EEOC's reg-
ulations encourage employers to be proactive in preventing sex-
ual harassment by implementing effective anti-harassment
93 See Patterson, supra note 60, at 249-250.
94 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852.
95 See id.
96 See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765, 762.
97 See id. at 761.
98 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852.
99 See id.
100 See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765.
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policies and by training its supervisors.o1 In an effort to avoid
litigation, many employers do adopt broad policies.102 However,
these policies can be overly harsh on employees because, in the
employer's effort to avoid liability, it implements blanket
prohibitions of conduct instead of specifically prohibiting sexual
harassment.103
As previously discussed, establishing a prima facie case of sex-
ual harassment is a multi-step process, which can prove to be
difficult for a victim, especially when the employer asserts af-
firmative defenses. The employee must prove the harassment
was unwelcome, the harassment affected the terms and condi-
tions of his or her employment, and the employer was liable for
the harassment.10 4 Additionally, the employee must overcome
any affirmative defenses asserted by the employer. 05 These ob-
stacles can become even more difficult for the victim when the
harassment is perpetrated over social media.106 As the next part
discusses, the use of social media to sexually harass an employee
can present novel problems for the victim in overcoming each of
the above obstacles.
101 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 42 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)
(2010); Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); Avery, supra
note 56, at 19.
102 See Patterson, supra note 60, at 250-252.
103 Id. (describing how employer policies are often focused on avoiding liti-
gation rather than preventing sexual harassment).
104 See Avery, supra note 56, at 5.
105 See Patterson, supra note 60, at 249-50.
106 Although offensive remarks and pictures were posted to an online social
forum, the plaintiffs in the following cases had to face additional burdens to
prove the harassment was unwelcome and was imputable to the employer:
Compare Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 91-93 (racially charged comments on a
Facebook page dedicated to the company's photos was not imputable to the
employer because the employer itself did not know about the website) and
Urban, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124307, at *27-28 (no harassment where sexu-
ally suggestive photos of workers were placed on a MySpace page because,
although the employee's MySpace page was offensive, employees had to go
out of their way to see it.) with Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,
567 F.3d 263, 273 (2009) (finding the harassment was severe and pervasive
because the victim could escape neither the open pornographic materials left
on co-workers' desks nor the co-workers' sharing of pornographic photos of
their girlfriends).
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IV. THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS
There are four main issues to explore in the context of Title
VII harassment through social media. The first issue is whether
comments on a third-party online networking site create a hos-
tile working environment. How does an employee prove these
comments were unwelcome? The second issue is the liability of
the employer. Is the employer liable for networking activity oc-
curring at the office or off-site? Does it matter if the social
networking site was set up or supported by the employer?107 Do
employer internet usage or anti-harassment policies play a role
in liability? The third issue concerns the privacy rights of em-
ployees in relation to online networking sites. Are interactions
on social networking sites admissible in court? What affect do
employer internet usage policies have on privacy rights? This
part focuses on these questions as it describes the added diffi-
culty social media presents for victims trying to establish a prima
facie case of sexual harassment.
A. Severe & Pervasive: Does Activity on a Third-Party
Website Really Create a Hostile Work Environment?
If an employee posts pictures of female workers in sexually
suggestive poses in his cubicle or office, and writes his comments
next to each picture, such action is likely to establish a hostile
work environment claim because the photos are a physical part
of the work environment.108 In this situation, the victim cannot
"escape" the harassment because she cannot avoid seeing the
photos. 109 If an employee posts those same photos on a third-
107 For an example of an employer who uses social media for their current
and former employees, see SODEXO, http://www.sodexoalumni.com/network-
ing.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
108 See Gallagher, 567 F.3d at 271-72 (finding the harassment was severe and
pervasive because the victim could not escape the co-workers harassing ac-
tions, such as leaving open pornographic materials on their desks and sharing
pornographic photos of their girlfriends).
109 See id.
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party website, which his co-workers frequently visit, this would
be much less likely to establish a hostile work environment.11o
The rationale is that social networks are more easily avoided
than hard copy photos on an office wall."' Social networks are
not a physical part of the work environment and employees' use
of these networks is less likely to be obvious in the workplace.112
However, courts have not yet addressed the increasing role so-
cial media plays in the employment context, and the distinction
between online and hard copy photos may become obsolete as
employees depend more on social media sites to interact with
each other. 13
In addition, the frequency of instances of harassment affects
the determination of a hostile work environment.114 As the se-
verity of the harassment increases, the required amount of fre-
quency declines.115 For example, "[c]ourts have recognized that
'even a single episode of harassment, if severe enough, can es-
tablish a hostile work environment."'116
Therefore, federal courts have put more weight on evidence
of face-to-face harassment than they do on evidence of online
harassment." 7 Courts have found that if sexually suggestive pic-
110 See Urban, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124307 at *9.
111 See id. (stating that however offensive an employee's MySpace page was,
it did not create a hostile environment because the employees had to go out
of their way to see it.).
112 Compare Gallagher, 567 F.3d at 271-72 with Urban, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124307 at *9.
113 See Zelizer, supra note 15, at 52 (describing the prevalence of social me-
dia in the workplace). See also Oncale, 532 U.S. at 81-82 (stating that the
social context of an office needs to be considered in deciding whether or not
harassment is severe and pervasive).
114 See supra Part III.C.; Ferris, 277 F.3d at 137; Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at
85-86 (stating that the court could not find employer liability for a mere three
instances of potentially harassing conduct spread out over time).
115 Ferris, 277 F.3d at 136-37.
116 See Jeffery S. Klein and Nicholas J. Pappas, "Jones v. Clinton": An
Emerging Trend in Title Vll Law, N.Y. L.J., June 1, 1998, at 3 (quoting Torres
v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1997)). See also Ferris, 277 F.3d at
136.
117 Compare R.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 371 Fed. App'x. at 233-234 (granting sum-
mary judgment for defendants because three emails, multiple alleged online
chats, and one five minute face-to-face conversation occurring over a three
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tures are posted on a website, they are not forced upon the em-
ployees in the workplace and are, therefore, less likely to be
pervasive in the workplace.1lS The reasoning provided is an em-
ployee has to go out of his or her way to visit the social network-
ing site and may, therefore, avoid the hostile environment
created by it.119 This reasoning neglects the reality that most
employees communicate and socialize with one another through
a social media site.
In addition to the escapable nature of social media, victims
must also deal with the "unwelcomeness" requirement in hostile
environment claims.120 Unwelcomeness is a requirement only in
sexual harassment claims.121 The courts have adopted it from
the EEOC's guidelines.122 The goal of the "unwelcomeness" re-
quirement is to prevent employees who are romantically in-
volved with co-workers or supervisors from bringing "revenge"
suits against their ex-lovers or employers. 123 While courts agree
that unwelcome conduct cannot be incited or provoked by the
victim, there is no generally accepted standard for unwelcome-
ness.124 For example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Henson v. City of Dundee, stated the standard for "unwelcome-
month span could not create a severe and pervasive hostile environment for a
student) and Urban, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124307 (no harassment where
sexually suggestive pictures of workers were placed on a MySpace page) with
Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 70-71 (2d Cir. 2000)
(reversing grant of summary judgment for defendants where plaintiffs were
subjected to "a stream of racially offensive comments over the span of two to
three months" where plaintiffs and harassers were communicating face-to-
face).
118 See, e.g., Urban, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124307 at *9.
119 See id. (stating that however offensive an employee's MySpace page was,
it did not create a hostile environment because the employees had to go out
of their way to see it).
120 See Avery, supra note 56, at 5.
121 See id. (describing unwelcomeness as a special requirement for discrimi-
nation based on sex as opposed to other types of discrimination).
122 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually
Hostile Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733, 745-46 (2002) (describing the ori-
gins of the unwelcomeness standard in the courts).
123 See Avery, supra note 56, at 5.
124 See Chambers, supra note 122, at 751-52 (describing the various stan-
dards for unwelcomeness that courts have used).
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ness" simply requires that the victim did not encourage or incite
the harassing behavior.125 On the other hand, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in Reed v. Shepard, stated regardless of a
victim's voluntary participation in an activity, the proper inquiry
for "unwelcomeness" is whether or not the victim indicated that
the harassing conduct was unwelcome or undesired. 126
A recent case from the Eastern District of New York, Urban
v. Capital Fitness d/b/a XSport Fitness, explains the issue of un-
welcomeness in relation to sexual harassment over social
networking sites.127 It suggests that because a social media web-
site is not a physical part of the workplace, and therefore easily
escapable, the victim has a higher burden to meet to prove con-
tent on a website contributes to the overall hostile environ-
ment.128 In Urban, the victim alleged that a MySpace page
developed by a male co-worker contributed to the hostile envi-
ronment at the workplace because it featured other gym em-
ployees in sexually suggestive poses.129 These pictures were
taken at the workplace, and the page included the gym's logo. 130
In addition, the same male co-worker operated a MySpace page
with all of the gym's female employees listed as his top
friends.131 The court stated that because the female workers fea-
tured on the MySpace page did not complain about their photos,
there was no "gender related hostility" added to the work envi-
ronment by the MySpace page.132 The court further held that
the MySpace pictures, along with the other alleged conduct on
the whole, were not objectively severe and pervasive enough to
create a hostile environment.133
125 See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating
that the standard for unwelcomeness is merely that the plaintiff did not incite
the harassment).
126 See Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1991).
127 See Urban, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124307 at *9.
128 See id. See also R.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 371 Fed. App'x at 233-34.
129 See Urban, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124307 at *7.
130 See id.
131 See id. at *9.
132 See id.
133 See id. at *9-10.
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While Urban is a district court case in the Second Circuit, the
district court analyzed the pictures posted to MySpace by fol-
lowing the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in the Reed decision.134
Because the workers featured on the site never complained
about the content of the site, the court assumed that the conduct
was welcomed by the other female workers and did not create
tension or hostility in the workplace.135 Therefore, the conduct
was not actionable.136 The court reasoned that the real victims
of the photographs were the subjects of the photographs.137 If
the subjects of the photos had no objections to their images on a
third-party site, why should any other employees be of-
fended?'38 Such reasoning, however, ignores the fact that a
posting on a third-party site, such as MySpace, with the com-
pany logo can be analogous to the situation of hard copy photos
posted on a cubicle.139 Photos of models in bikinis are not
photos of the victim, but they suggest an environment which is
hostile and demeaning to women.140 Regardless of which un-
welcomeness standard is used, the focus should be on the vic-
tim's reaction to it, not the feelings of the people in the
photos.141
134 See Urban, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124307 at *9; Reed, 939 F.2d at 491
(stating that regardless of a victim's voluntary participation in an activity, the
proper inquiry for "unwelcomeness" is whether or not the victim indicated
that the harassing conduct was unwelcome or undesired).
135 Urban, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124307 at *9.
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See Biber, supra note 21 (finding that participants thought that misogy-
nist comments made online were more offensive than in a traditional face-to-
face setting).
139 See id.; Curley, supra note 1, at 542-45 (describing different types of so-
cial media, their non-work uses, and the fact that many employers do use
social media); Oncale, 532 U.S. at 81-82 (stating that the social context of the
workplace should be a factor in determining what constitutes harassment).
140 Gallagher, 567 F.3d at 273-74 (finding harassment where co-workers left
open pornographic materials on their desks).
141 Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (stating that the standard for unwelcomeness is
merely that the plaintiff did not incite the harassment).
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Employees are typically not required to join social networks
to perform their job functions.14 2 As a result, employees can
join and leave these networks at will without formal employ-
ment related consequences. 14 3 Yet, the social context of the
workplace could be dependent on social networking if all or
most of the employees communicate that way.14 4 It would be
improper for courts to assume that social networks are com-
pletely optional for all employees because even the United
States Supreme Court has emphasized the social context of the
workplace is an important factor in the determination of a hos-
tile work environment, and courts should take the online envi-
ronment into account when they consider hostile environment
claims .145
B. Is the Employer Liable for Employee Social
Networking Activity?
While the courts in Urban and Jabbar did not find that the
social networking activity created a hostile environment, they
did concede that social networking activity has an impact on the
workplace, regardless of the time and place where the initial
comment was made.146 Whether or not the conduct occurred
off-duty (or not at the workplace) typically plays a large role in
determining liability for traditional harassment. 1 4 7 Because em-
ployer liability is based on agency principles, some argue that an
employer is only liable if the harassing conduct happens when
142 See Curley, supra note 1, at 542-45 (2010) (describing different types of
social media, their non-work uses and the fact that many employers do use
social media).
143 See id.; Paul, supra note 8, at 118.
144 See Curley, supra note 1, at 542-45.
145 See Oncale, 532 U.S. at 81-82.
146 Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 85-86 (the court stated that the instances of
harassment, one instance being a posting on a Facebook page, were not se-
vere or pervasive enough to warrant a finding of hostile environment); Ur-
ban, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124307 at *9 (stating that sexually suggestive
photos of gym workers on a Facebook page could not contribute to a hostile
environment especially considering the subjects of the photos had not
complained).
147 See Patterson, supra note 60, at 250-252.
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the employees are on-duty or at the workplace.148 However, it
has been established that off-duty conduct can have conse-
quences in the workplace, and the employers are liable for the
hostile workplace that results.149 This section first discusses the
role of off-duty conduct. In the social media context, this in-
volves conduct and comments posted to a third-party website.
While there is inconsistency among the circuits as to whether
off-duty conduct is admissible to prove a hostile environment
claim, the courts should take the context of the comments into
consideration when deciding whether or not to admit the
evidence.150
Next, this section describes the role of employer policies in
determining liability for harassment. In determining liability,
courts rely on the policies and procedures employers have in
place for dealing with employee misconduct.151 The employer is
liable for the actions of a victim's supervisor, unless the em-
ployer can assert an affirmative defense that they followed their
own policies designed to prevent this type of behavior and that
the employee failed to take advantage of these policies in order
to stop or mitigate the harassment.152 The employer is not liable
for a co-worker's harassing actions, unless the victim can show
148 See id. at 250-264 (arguing that employer's should only be liable for on-
duty harassment).
149 See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 744; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 765-66 (establishing
employer liability for the hostile environment as opposed to quid pro quo
actions); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006) (where the
court acknowledged that harassment which has consequences in the work-
place can be used to support a hostile environment claim); Ferris, 277 F.3d at
136 (stating that one instance of an off-duty sexual assault could be enough to
support a claim of sexual harassment, but mere flirtatious behavior would not
be enough to support a claim); Duggins ex rel. Duggins v. Steak 'N Shake,
Inc., 3 F. App'x 302 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that off-duty harassment can be
used in a hostile work environment claim if the plaintiff worked closely with
the harasser).
150 See infra notes 160-169 and accompanying text (describing the different
approaches of the First, Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts in admit-
ting or not admitting off-duty conduct used as proof of hostile environment
claims).
151 See Patterson, supra note 60, at 250-252.
152 See Avery, supra note 56, at 3-4.
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that (1) the employer was negligent in providing an opportunity
for the victim to complain; or (2) that the employer knew about
the harassment and did nothing to stop it.'15
1. Admissibility of Off-Duty Conduct
Smart phones, and other mobile devices like laptops and tab-
lets, blur the line between personal and work time.154 They al-
low employees to check their work e-mail, post comments or
photos to a website, and easily communicate with co-workers
from any location at any time.55 Even more so than laptops,
smart phones now make it easier for anyone to post a comment
on a social media website from almost any location, including a
workplace whose own network blocks the use of social network-
ing sites.156
The focus of a hostile environment claim is, necessarily, the
workplace.157 Therefore, off-site or off-duty conduct is not al-
ways admissible in a hostile environment claim.158 Though sev-
eral circuit courts take different approaches, there are fairly
uniform guidelines to determine what types of off-duty conduct
is admissible to prove a hostile environment claim.159
While severity of the harassment is a factor, circuit courts gen-
erally allow off-duty or off-site conduct that permeates the
workplace environment to be admitted as evidence of a hostile
work environment.160 For example, the Sixth Circuit has stated,
". . . when an employee is forced to work for, or in close proxim-
ity to, someone who is harassing her outside the workplace, the
153 Ferris, 277 F.3d at 136.
154 See Oncidi, supra note 2 (describing how voicemail, Blackberries, and the
internet make it possible to do work anywhere).
155 See id.
156 See supra Part II.A. See also FACEBOOK, supra note 15 (Fifty percent of
Facebook users update via mobile phone); Zelizer, supra note 15.
157 See Patterson, supra note 60, at 254.
158 See id.
159 See id. (arguing that there is a circuit split between the courts on whether
off-duty conduct is admissible in Title VII sexual harassment claims).
160 See Ferris, 277 F.3d at 136; Duggins, 3 F. App'x at 302; Doe, 456 F.3d at
704.
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employee may reasonably perceive the work environment to be
hostile." 1 6 1 In Duggins v. Steak'n Shake, a victim's off-duty rape
by a "co-employee" who worked at a different Steak'n Shake
location from the victim could not be used as evidence of a hos-
tile work environment in the victim's case because the victim
and her co-employee never worked together.162 However, in
Doe v. Oberweis, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals allowed
evidence that the manager had off-duty sex with the underage
victim to support a hostile work environment claim because it
contributed to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
hostile environment.163 The victim continued to work under the
same manager for two weeks before quitting. 164 Additionally,
there were several other reported instances of workplace harass-
ment perpetrated on both the victim and other female employ-
ees of the store.165 The court commented that sexual
harassment "need not be committed in the workplace . . . to
have consequences there." 1 66
The relevant difference between these cases is the effect of
the off-duty conduct on the workplace atmosphere.167 The vic-
tim in Duggins never had to see the co-employee/perpetrator at
her workplace, while the victim in Doe continued to be super-
vised by the perpetrator, who continued to harass her.168 Inter-
preted in the context of social media, the time and place of
online postings or harassment become less important than their
effects on the workplace atmosphere. 169 Therefore, if postings
from one employee to another on a third-party social network-
ing site have consequences in the workplace, then the victim
161 See Duggins, 3 F. App'x at 311 (finding no employer liability where the
only instance of harassment was a rape that occurred off-duty and the victim
and employee rapist had not and did not work together).
162 See id. at 311-12.
163 Doe, 456 F.3d at 715-16.
164 See id. at 716.
165 See id. at 712-713.
166 See id.
167 Compare Duggins, 3 F. App'x at 311-12 with Doe, 456 F.3d at 715.
1s See Duggins 3 F. App'x at 311-12; Doe, 456 F.3d at 715 (holding that
certain off-duty conduct had consequences in the workplace).
169 See id.
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should be allowed to use that evidence to support a claim of a
hostile work environment, regardless of the time, place, and
means of the posting.
2. Employer Policies and Actions
As the courts tackle harassment through the use of social me-
dia, the employer's knowledge of the online harassment and
subsequent inaction to stop the conduct play a large role in de-
termining liability.170 When an employer is not involved in so-
cial media, and it takes action to stop the online harassment, it is
less likely to be held vicariously liable. 71 In Jabbar v. Travel
Services, Inc., for example, the District Court of Puerto Rico
held that the employer could not be liable because the company
had neither organized nor condoned the Facebook page.172 A
co-worker posted a harassing comment to a Facebook page con-
taining photos of the victim at a work function.173 The victim
claimed that work party photos were typically uploaded to a
Facebook page so that all employees could have access to
them.174 The victim's claim that the employer knew about the
Facebook page was the only evidence the victim relied on to
prove the employer might have known about the photos.'75 Ad-
ditionally, there were only two other alleged instances of harass-
ment for which the plaintiff also lacked evidence.176 In this case,
neither the workplace conduct nor the online conduct was
enough to support a finding of a hostile work environment.177
170 See Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 85-86 (racially charged comments on a
Facebook page dedicated to the company's photos was not imputable to the
employer because the employer did not know about the website); Wolfe, 600
F. Supp. 2d at 1017 (finding that a school district could potentially be liable
for the actions of harassing students when there was clear evidence that they
knew about the harassing conduct and did not intervene).
171 See Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 81-82.
172 See id.
173 See id. at 81-85.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 See id.
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Most importantly, the employer was able to demonstrate that it
followed through on its anti-harassment policy and procedures
because it blocked access to all Facebook pages on its office
computers.178
Conversely, Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Arkansas Sch. Dist., al-
though not a Title VII case, demonstrates that repeated in-
stances of online and in-person harassment that are known to
the employer or school district will likely enable the victim to
overcome a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judg-
ment.179 In Wolfe, a student was repeatedly harassed by stu-
dents and eventually administrators, using a combination of
physical, verbal, and online acts. 80 The Western District of Ar-
kansas held that the harassment could be imputed to the school
district because the school district knew about the harassing stu-
dent's acts, including the posting of videos showing the victim
being beaten-up, the dedication of a Facebook page to hating
the victim, and several defamatory comments posted to that
Facebook page.181 Additionally, the school district set up its
own website titled "The Whole Story" on which several defama-
tory comments about the victim were also posted.182 These on-
line acts created a record, which enabled the victim to show the
school administration knew about the victim's complaint and
did not follow its procedures to stop the harassment.183
Despite the fact that online harassment is more difficult for
the employer to monitor than traditional workplace conduct, the
employer is obligated to stop or limit access to that harassment
when it becomes aware of the harassment. 184 If the employer
decides to participate in social media in order to disclaim any
178 See id.
179 Wolfe, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1020-21.
180 See id. at 1015-18.
181 See id. at 1017-21.
182 See id. at 1021.
183 See id. (jury ruled in favor of the school district in the final outcome of
the sexual harassment charge).
184 See Kichline, supra note 5; Zelizer, supra note 15; Curley, supra note 1, at
541-42 (all describing scenarios in which an employer could be liable for em-
ployee social media networking and recommending steps to avoid liability).
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liability for the original harassment, this will not adequately in-
sulate it from liability in a harassment claim.185 As illustrated in
Jabbar and Wolfe, the response of the employer/school district
once they became aware of the harassing conduct was the core
issue-not the severity of the harassment.186 In Wolfe, the on-
line harassment was not the main avenue of harassment, but it
did document specific incidents of harassment that the school
district could no longer ignore as it had been ignoring the physi-
cal assault and name calling.187 Conversely, in Jabbar, the em-
ployer followed its anti-harassment policy, blocking Facebook
access on its computers once it became aware of the posting.188
C. Privacy
If postings on a social networking site can lead to employer
liability in a hostile environment claim, how can employers be
proactive to stop the harassment and their eventual liability? In
Jabbar, the employer blocked employee access to the offending
site when they first became aware of the posting. 89 What other
techniques are employers able to use to curb online harassment
while respecting the panoply of state and federal privacy laws?
In addition to the Fourth Amendment, a host of federal statutes,
including the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and
the National Labor Relations Act, protect different aspects of
employee privacy.o90 There are many articles which focus exclu-
sively on employee privacy and discovery as they relate to social
media and internet usage, in particular.191 This article only gives
185 See Wolfe, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
186 Compare Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 91-93 with Wolfe, 600 F. Supp. 2d at
1015-1018.
187 See Wolfe, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-1018.
188 See Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 91-93.
189 See id. at 82-85.
190 See Paul, supra note 8, at 127.
191 See Aaron Blank, Article, On the Precipe of E-Discovery: Can Litigants
Obtain Employee Social Networking Web Site Information through Employ-
ers?, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 487 (2009-2010); Evan E. North, Comment
and Note, Facebook Isn't Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social Network-
ing Websites, 58 KAN. L. REv. 1279 (2010).
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a brief summary of the issues most pertinent to sexual harass-
ment and hostile environment claims as a result of social media
usage to provide the context in which privacy concerns arise
during the discovery phase of a hostile environment claim.192
This section focuses on how employers monitor employees' so-
cial networking and internet activity, and the employees' inter-
est in privacy during the discovery phase of a hostile
environment claim. While clear employee monitoring policies
are not a cure-all for harassment through social media, employ-
ers can use these policies to act preventively.193 If employers
actively monitor employee usage and enforce their anti-harass-
ment policies, they will be able to address problems before liti-
gation commences. 194
1. Employer Monitoring and Access to Employee Activity
As discussed above, employers can be held liable for em-
ployee social networking activity.195 Because the courts and the
EEOC impose a duty to prevent sexual harassment on employ-
ers, the employers have a strong interest in monitoring em-
ployee internet and social networking activity to protect
themselves from liability in sexual harassment and other litiga-
tion.196 Employers can easily monitor employee internet activity
on a daily basis through employee monitoring software or net-
work monitoring software, both of which can produce the con-
tent of social networking sites that employees visit.197 Employee
monitoring software tracks the computer usage of a specific em-
192 See Blank, supra note 191, at 487; North, supra note 191, at 1279.
193 Compare Blank, supra note 191, at 511-13 (discussing the need for clear
employer monitoring policies) with Kichline, supra note 5, at 16-24 (discuss-
ing the potential pitfalls of knowing too much information about employees
as a result of monitoring activities).
194 See Blank, supra note 191, at 511-13 (discussing how the need for em-
ployers to monitor employees' internet actions trumps employee privacy
when there is a clear employer monitoring policy in place).
195 See supra Parts III.A-B.
196 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 42 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)
(2010); Avery, supra note 56, at 19; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
197 See Blank, supra note 191, at 499-500.
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ployee, including e-mails sent or received, internet sites visited,
documents accessed, and instant messages sent.s98 Network
monitoring software tracks all internet activity on the em-
ployer's network and can be sorted by employee.199 Depending
on employer preference, it can capture only the time and the
website visited or more detailed information such as the content
of the websites visited. 200 If an employer uses either of these
methods to track employee internet activity before a lawsuit oc-
curs, the employer will easily be able to produce the employee's
internet activity in discovery.201 However, by actively monitor-
ing employee internet usage, an employer can also use these
methods preventively to address issues before they turn into liti-
gation problems. 202 For example, the employer may be able to
spot a problem between employees or, at a minimum, confirm
or deny accusations of harassment. 203 The employer then has an
opportunity to put the employees on notice that there is a prob-
lem and address that problem through their human resources
department's processes. 204
Another way to retrieve employee social networking activity
is by searching the hard drive of an employee's computer.205
This method is not viable as a preventative monitoring activity
because it requires a forensic expert, but it can be used as a dis-
covery method.206 Hard drive searches are also significantly less
reliable for producing social networking content because the
data may only be available in temporary internet files.207 More-
198 See id. at 499.
199 See id. at 500-501.
200 See id. at 500.
201 See id. at 499-500.
202 See id. at 511-513; Zelizer, supra note 15, at 56 (describing the situations
in which a company might want to intervene when an employee makes a
social networking post).
203 See id.
204 See id. (describing how an employer has an opportunity to put the em-
ployee on notice if they discover prohibited activity through social network-
ing monitoring).
205 See Blank, supra note 191, at 501-503.
206 See id.
207 See id.
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over, the rich data from social media sites is often harder to
trace than other types of data on a hard drive. 208
2. Discovery Rules Relating to Electronic Data and Social
Media Sites
The United States Supreme Court has recognized an em-
ployee's interest in protecting personal information from misap-
propriation, but limitations have been placed on this interest.209
Employees lose their reasonable expectation of privacy in elec-
tronic information stored on their computers when an employer
has a well-known computer and internet monitoring policy. 210
When an employee has been notified of the employer's policy,
depending on its parameters, the employee may no longer have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in her internet activities on
her work computer.211 Several courts have held that an em-
ployer has a greater interest in promoting worker efficiency and
keeping the workplace harassment-free than the employee has
208 See id. at 503-04.
209 See id. at 508-09; O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718-19 (1986)
(describing an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy in an office
where personal information was stored).
210 See Blank, supra note 191, at 508-510.
211 See Muick v. Glenayre Electronics, 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002); id.
at 508-509.
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in maintaining his or her privacy.212 This is especially true when
employees are using employer owned computers or networks. 213
Because employers typically own the computers and networks
that employees use for their internet access, and they have an
interest in keeping the workplace harassment-free, employers
can freely monitor employee social networking activity at the
office or worksite.214 An employer should enforce its anti-har-
assment policies strictly and evenly among all employees.215
Employers are free to monitor their employees' use of social
networking sites (when they are at work) and sanction bad be-
havior according to their internet usage and anti-harassment
policies. 216
Employees who post information to social networking sites
may lose their claim to privacy simply because posting on the
212 See Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002
WL 974676, at *2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (holding that the employer's legiti-
mate interest in protecting its employees from harassment trumps employee
privacy interests); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (holding that the employer interest in preventing employee misconduct
outweighs any privacy interests that the employee has); Blank, supra note
191, at 512-513 (comparing how courts have weighed employer's interests
against employee privacy interests). See also Ronald J. Levine & Susan L.
Swatski-Lebson, Social Networking and Litigation, E-COMMERCE L. &
STRATEGY (Law Journal Newsletters, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2009, at 1, 2,
available at http://www.herrick.com/siteFiles/Publications/CBC006F756591F
F0160327DAO71BDB3F.pdf (stating that a social media user is making a
"conscious choice" to publicize their information); Blank, supra note 191, at
510 (stating that the internet is a public medium so users do not have an
expectation to privacy when they post information on the internet).
213 See Blank, supra note 191, at 512-513 (describing how employees lose
their expectation to privacy when the employer can monitor and access their
computers).
214 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 42 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)
(2010); Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22; Blank, supra note 191, at 512-13; Avery,
supra note 56, at 19.
215 See Zelizer, supra note 15, at 57 (describing the possibility of a discrimi-
nation suit resulting in uneven enforcement of an employer's social media or
internet usage policy).
216 See id.; Curley, supra note 1, at 541; Kichline, supra note 5 (all describing
the ability of employers to monitor employees, according to established poli-
cies in order to monitor employee behavior and intervene in cases of prohib-
ited behavior).
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social network is deemed a public act.2 17 For a social networking
post to be deemed private, the user must have a reasonable sub-
jective belief that the information will remain private.218 The
United States District Court of Puerto Rico addressed individ-
ual privacy interests in pictures posted on the internet as a mat-
ter of first impression in United States v. Gines-Perez.219 The
court stated, ". . . it strikes the Court as obvious that a claim to
privacy is unavailable to someone who places information on an
indisputably, public medium, such as the Internet, without tak-
ing any measures to protect the information." [bold in
original]220
Even if an employee attempts to restrict access to his or her
social networking information, most social networking sites
have disclaimers that state the public may still be able to view
some information. 221 Based on these disclaimers, some courts
have ruled that even posts on a private or restricted social
networking site may be deemed public because the site cannot
control third parties who access the information and publicize it
more widely.222 Despite the fact that employees may feel that
they are posting personal thoughts, they are still using a very
accessible medium, and these thoughts are not private.223 Post-
ing information on the internet, and social media sites in partic-
ular, leads to a presumption that the employee intended to
publicize the information so that he or she can no longer claim
an interest in keeping that information private.224
217 See Levine, supra note 212, at 2 (stating that a social media user is mak-
ing a "conscious choice" to publicize their information); Blank, supra note
191, at 510 (stating that the internet is a public medium so users do not have
an expectation to privacy when they post information on the internet).
218 See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361-63 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (de-
fendant-telephone user could reasonably have expected that his conversation
would remain private).
219 See United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.P.R. 2002).
220 See Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225.
221 See Blank, supra note 191, at 511.
222 See Levine, supra note 212, at 2.
223 See Blank, supra note 191, at 511.
224 See id.
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However, the monitoring of employee social networking sites
is not without its risks.225 While trying to prevent sexual harass-
ment, the employer could gain personal information about an
employee that they should not have.2 2 6 For example, an em-
ployer could learn that an employee has terminal cancer or an
illness. Once the employer knows this information, any subse-
quent employment actions against that employee are suspect. 2 2 7
This is likely why a recent survey of chief information officers
showed that the majority of them banned social networking
sites.228
Therefore, aggressive monitoring of employee internet and
social media activity alone is not always the most efficient or
effective way of preventing employer liability in sexual harass-
ment claims. 229 Moreover, an outright ban of social networking
does nothing to stop off-duty social networking activity from af-
fecting the workplace environment.230 Employers should use
anti-harassment policies and procedures in conjunction with a
clear and evenly applied internet usage monitoring policy in or-
der to best prevent and defend against sexual harassment
claims.231
225 See Curley, supra note 1, at 16.
226 See Kichline, supra note 5, at 16-20.
227 See id at 19-20 (describing this situation in the context of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, where access to information about an employee's
health status takes away the "unaware" defense).
228 No Facebook at Work, PHYSORG.COM, Oct. 8, 2009, available at http://
www.physorg.com/newsl74244820.html.
229 See Kichline, supra note 5, at 16-20, 24.
230 See supra discussion Section B.II on the admissibility of off-duty conduct
in sexual harassment suits. See also Zelizer, supra note 15, at 254-56.
231 See discussion supra Section B on employer harassment policies and af-
firmative defenses to sexual harassment. See also Zelizer, supra note 15, at
254-56 (describing the possibility of a discrimination suit resulting in uneven
enforcement of an employer's social media or internet usage policy); Blank,
supra note 191, at 511-514 (discussing the need for clear employer monitoring
policies).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although social networking activities may have started out as
personal activities that employees did on their own time, they
have now invaded the workspace with many employers embrac-
ing social media as a recruiting and marketing tool.232 As em-
ployers blur the line between work and personal time by giving
employees Blackberries and requiring them to check their e-
mail when they are not at the workplace, employees are also
blurring the line between work and personal time by changing
their Facebook status and posting comments on their friends'
blogs while they are at work. 2 3 3
As social media is incorporated into the workplace culture, it
becomes another possible forum for harassment and hostility.234
When social media has been integrated into the workplace cul-
ture, and the employer allows employees to access social media
at work, the employer should be held accountable for any resul-
tant hostile environment claim caused by unwanted contact by
supervisors or co-workers.235 The employer has a duty to and an
interest in preventing hostile environments from occurring.236
Employers should have monitoring tools and anti-harassment
232 See Curley, supra note 1, at 542-49.
233 See Oncidi, supra note 2 (describing how voicemail, Blackberries, and the
internet make it possible to do work anywhere); Zelizer, supra note 15, at 52-
53 (the majority of social media posts are made during prime working hours
from 10 a.m. CDT to 2 p.m. CDT).
234 See Kichline, supra note 5, at 16-21 (describing possible misunderstand-
ings that could result from employee use of social media in the workplace).
235 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852 (holding the employer vicariously liable
for harassment perpetrated by a victim's supervisor); Ferris, 277 F.3d at 136
(holding the employer liable for actions of a victim's co-worker); Oncale, 532
U.S. at 81-82 (describing how all the circumstances surrounding the harass-
ment and its context should be considered by the court in determining
liability).
236 See Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *2 (stating that the employer's legiti-
mate interest in protecting its employees from harassment trumps employee
privacy interests); Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101 (holding that the employer's
interest in preventing inappropriate and illegal activity over its e-mail system
outweighs any privacy interests that the employee has); Blank, supra note
191, at 512-13 (comparing how courts have weighed employers' interests
against employee privacy interests).
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tools at their disposal in order to limit their liability in sexual
harassment suits involving social media usage. 2 3 7
While the courts may not give as much weight to evidence of
online harassment now, it seems likely they will consider social
networking sites as contributing to hostility in the workplace en-
vironment in the near future.238 Social networks are becoming
part of the workplace culture, and courts should not let the fact
that the harassing comments or photos are posted online be a
barrier to recovery for the victim. It is important to require a
nexus between the online harassment and the workplace, but
the courts should recognize employees can rely on social media
to communicate with their co-workers whether they are in the
office or not. In instances when social media is part of the work-
place culture, the court should give as much weight to online
harassment as it does to face-to face harassment.
Stephanie A. Kevil*
237 See Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 86-87.
238 Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 93-94 (the court stated that the instances of
harassment, one instance being a posting on a Facebook page, were not se-
vere or pervasive enough to warrant a finding of hostile environment; but the
court did not address the issue of whether evidence of harassment over the
social network could be used to support a harassment claim); Urban, 2010
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